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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN F. RUSSELL, \ 
Respondent, { 
Case No. 9648 
vs. I 
GRANT L. VALENTINE, 
Appellant and Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Grant L. Valentine, appellant in the above-entitled 
matter, and petitioner herein, in accordance with Rule 
76( e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petitions 
this Court to reconsider its initial opinion in the above-
entitled matter filed on the 3rd day of December, 1962, 
with relation to the issues hereinafter set forth, and 
based on this Petition to rehear and determine such 
issues; .as grounds for this Petition, petitioner respect-
fully urges that the Court, in its opinion, erred in its 
determination of both fact and law in the following par-
ticulars: 
1. In the determination of faet that Section 8 of the 
leasehold instrument (renewal clause) was ambiguous so 
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as to permit the introduction and admission of parol 
evidence; 
2. In the determination of law that parol evidence, 
may be received to vary and alter the terms of a written 
instrument and to create rather than cure an ambiguity 
with respect thereto. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner respectfully prays 
that this Court consider this petition and the brief an-
nexed in support hereof, that the Court issue an order 
to rehear and determine the issues raised, and that upon 
rehearing, the Court enter its judgment reversing the 
decision of the lower Court. 
HANSON & BALDWIN & 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Petitioner 
515 Kearns Building 
8alt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPR.bME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN F. RUSSELL, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 9648 
GRANT L. VALENTINE, 
Appellant and Petitioner. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATE11EN·T OF FACTS 
A full embodiment of the f.ac.ts of this matter are not 
required as they relate to the Petition for Rehearing, the 
san1e having been set forth in the Brief of Appellant 
heretofore filed with the Court (see App. Brief, p. 2, 3). 
It is adequate to say that plaintiff, in May, 19'50, 
conveyed a leasehold estate in eertain real property 
located in Weber County to Self-Service Enterprises, 
Inc., the Petitioner acquiring such leasehold interest 
through a series of assignments stemming from Self-
Service. The writing under which the conveyance was 
made (Clause 8 thereof) provided that the lessee, or its 
assigns, held a right to renew the lease provided that the 
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latter met and satisfied specified conditions precedent 
(Exhibit 1). The petitioner fully performed such condi-
tions (Exhibit 8). 
It was asserted by respondent in the lower court and 
upon appeal that Clause 8 was ambiguous and unen-
forceable; particularly, it was claimed that the term or 
period of renewal could not he reasonably ascertained 
from the writing,' necessitating the use of extrinsic testi-
mony. The clause under attack states that: 
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and 
perform all of the terms and conditions of this 
lease, on his part to be kept and performed, said 
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease 
for a further period beginning as of the termina-
tion date of this lease, provided he shall notify 
the Lessor in writing thirty days prior to the 
terms of this agreement that he desires such re-
newal and provided further, that he shall sign or 
offer to sign a new lease upon the same terms 
and conditions as are herein contained." 
The District Court found the entire clause to be un-
enforceable and void for ambiguity and that any renewal 
the,reof, required further negotiation and execution, by 
conveyance, of a new estate (R. 22, 23). This ·Court, by 
its initial opinion, affirmed the Findings and Judgment 
of the lower court. It is to that opinion that this brief is 
directed. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DETERMINATION THAT CLAUSE 8 OF THE 
LEASE IS AM,BIGUOUS AND UNENFORCEABLE IS ER-
RONEOUS. 
a. The Plain Meaning of Such Clause is to and can be 
Gauged bu the Terms of the Conveuance. 
POINT II. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT PERMITS PAROL 
TESTIMONY TO CREATE RATHER THAN EXPLAIN THE 
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY IN THE LEASEHOLD INSTRU-
MENT. 
a. The Effect of the Decision is to Void Rather Than 
Interpret the Writing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DETERMINATION THAT CLAUSE 8 OF THE 
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS AND UNENFORCEABLE IS ER-
RONEOUS. 
a. The Plain Meaning of Such Clause is to and can be 
Gauged bu the Terms of the Conveyance. 
The leasehold instrument unde consideration con-
tains nine (9') par.agraphs, each devoted to a separate 
purpose, each performing a separate function as a part 
of the integrated lease. The purpose and function of 
Clause 8 could not he more pronounced, that is, the lessee 
upon performance of the conditions of the lease and upon 
proper notice, was granted an option to renew upon the 
terms and conditions of the initial conveyance. The 
Clause is susceptible to no other construction; the Opinion 
of the Court finds otherwise, however. 
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Why, it should be queried, is it to be presu1ned that 
the lessor was engaged in a penmanship exercise in giv-
ing the lessee the right to renew; that Russell didn't 
intend to grant that for which the writing calls~ The 
quick answer to this is that there is no presumption to 
that effect - that, in law, an individual is presumed to 
have given meaning to a writing rather than that which 
is meaningless. One need only turn to the writings of 
Wigmore for support of this rule of construction: 
"When a jural act is embodied in a single 
memorial, all other utterances of the parties on 
that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose 
of determining what are the terms of their act." 
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. 2425. 
The judicial policy underlying the presumption that 
a written declaration by a party is to be given effect is 
well put by Henroid, J., in Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 
7 U.2d 276, 323 P. 2d 259 (1958), wherein it was an-
nounced: 
''* * * but it is also elementary and of ex-
treme practical importance that we hold contrac-
ting parties to their fair and understandable 
language deliberately committed to writing and 
endorsed by them as signators thereto. * * * It 
is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for 
language which he hi1nself expouses. Such langu-
age is the ·only implement he gives us to fashion 
a determination as to the intentions of the par-
ties." 
There is little risk attached in saying that this axiom 
of construction is the life· blood of the pa.rol evidence 
rule. 
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It is said by the Court in paragraph 4 of its opinion 
that Clause 8 of the subject Lease is so ambiguous and 
tmcertain that extraneous evidence should be received to 
determine the "intention of the parties" (a st.atement 
made in light of the fact that Clause 8 is a grant by the 
Lessor, Russell, to the Lessee and if spoken orally, cotdd 
emin.ate only from the mouth of the Lessor). The Opin-
ion, in paragraph 2 thereof, sets forth Clause 8 in full 
and emphasis is given to the following phrase: 
''* * * said Lessee shall have the right to re-
new this lease for a furthe;;· period * * *" 
Petitioner is in accord with the Court that this 
phrase, indeed, is the keynote to a proper understanding 
and interpretation of the Clause. It, by chronology, may 
be digested word by word for its formal meaning and 
such has been accomplished by Petitioner in his Brief on 
Appeal (see App. Brief, pp. 8-11). At the outside and in 
its most strained atmosphere, the phrase grants to the 
lessee a privilege, a power (which he would not otherwise 
have), a right to lawfully possess the leasehold estate for 
a time exceeding the original term; there is but a single, 
unitary period set forth in the writing which requires a 
ten (10) year "term", and that provision is found in the 
granting clause on page 1 of Exhibit A: 
"* * * for the term of ten years". 
Ordinary parlance gives "period" .and ''term" a con-
generic meaning. Martinez v. Rocky Mounta.im & 8. F. 
Ry. Co., 47 P.2d 903 (N.M. 1935). Applying the canon 
of the "last antecedent", Dttnn v. Bryan, 77 Utah 604,299 
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P.ac. 253 ( 1931), in ascertaining the de1neanor of the word 
"period" at the end of the phrase emphasized by the 
Court, it is implicit that reference is made to the original 
··ten year term''. 
But the opinion of the Court, in paragraph 4, does 
not arrest its treatment of the emphasized phrase with 
a discussion of the integrated sentence; rather, it takes 
out of context four words "for a further period" which, 
it is said, is the focal point: 
"The crux of the matter is the phrase 'for a 
further period'". 
This prepositional phrase is then said to convey an in-
finite number of meanings, for example, ''one day, one 
week, one month, one year, and so on". Petitioner con-
curs that these four words, standing alone, aided by no 
other portion of Clause 8, and aided by no rules of con-. 
struction, would have a host of varied responses. But is 
this a proper test at all? 
Petitioner submits that it is not; that an adherence 
to this norm of construction would render every provi-
sion, condition or statement of every writing ambiguous, 
uncertain and unenforceable. This approach might have 
been in vogue in the day of the Sophists but not at the 
common law; it ignores the canon that a writing is inter-
preted as a whole (see Restatement of Contracts 235 (c)), 
the rule o~ pari· materia, and the doctrine of the last ante-
cedent. Dunn v. Bryan, supra. It overlooks the decisions 
of this Court in Ephriam Theatre Co1npany v. Hawk, 7 
tJ.2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221, and Wilson v. Gardner, 10 U.2d 
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89, 348 P. 2d 931 (1960); in the latter case it was de-
clared: 
"In considering a written instrument it is. a 
judicial function to interpret a written contract 
which is free from ambiguity and does not require 
oral testilnony to deterrnine its meaning. Am-
bigtt.ity in .ct written instrument does not ~wppear 
until the application of pertinent rules of inter-
pret.at~on to the face of the instrument leaves it 
generally uncertain which one of two or more 
n1e.anings is the proper meaning.'' (Emphasis 
ours). 
Admittedly, Clause 8 is not a shining spectacle of 
draftsmanship at its best; it could be more certain in its 
definition or explanation of: 
"the right to renew this lease for a further 
period". 
It could have specified the year, month, and day that the 
right of renewal ran. The fact that it did not so specify 
does not render it so ambiguous, when considered with 
the other portions and clauses of the lease, as to permit 
a traverse outside of the written instrument. ·The last 
phrase in Clause 8, itself, resolves any doubt that the 
lessor granted lessee a right to renew unde·r the same 
"terms and conditions'' as the primary writing: 
''provided * * * he shall sign or offer to sign 
a new lease upon the same terms and conditions 
as are herein contained." 
It would be a parody of the worst kind to say that the 
clause above quoted did not refer to all other elements of 
the lease, including the original term of ten years. Clause 
8 needs no crutch from parol evidence to portray its 
intent. 
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POINT II. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT PERMITS PAROL 
TESTIMONY TO CREATE RATHER THAN EXPLAIN THE 
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY IN THE LEASEHOLD INSTRU-
MENT. 
a. The Effect of the Decisi·on is to Void Rather Than 
Interpret the Writing. 
Once parol evidence was determined to be necessary 
in order to clarfy the alleged ambiguity arising out of 
Clause 8, its only legitimate function, when admitted, 
was to explain and illucidate the nature of Petitioner's 
right of renewal. Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 
Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943). For if .all else be uncer-
tain, there is no question but that Clause 8 was a "re-
newal" clause and that the lessee was granted the "right 
to renew'' by Russell. The findings of the trial court, 
approved in this Court's initial Opinion, do n'luch 1nore 
than penetrate Clause 8 to give certainty to the uncer-
tain. The findings eradicate the clause from the lease 
entirely; in effect, it denies petitioner any right to 
renew whatsoever, and places him in a position as 
though the writing never contained any renewal langu-
age. 
Finding No. 8 of the lower court provides in part: 
"8. The Court further finds that the pro-
visions * * * of the Lease referring to renewal 
* * * are .ambiguous and incapable of enforce-
ment, and that any extension, or renewal * * * 
would require negot.iations and execution of a 
new lease * * *". (En1phasis added) 
The finding, in itself, is contradictory for it acknow-
ledges the existence of .a "right to renew" and yet re-
10 
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quires negotiation of all elen1ents. Such result compounds 
any ambiguity formerly existing instead of clarifying it 
and reserves to the lessee nothing that he would not have 
possessed had there been no lease at all. It gives license 
to be done that which the Supreme Court of Washington 
has said can not be done : 
"Parol evidence is never admissible to create 
an ambiguity, but only to explatn or remove an 
ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument, 
or to identify a subject matter otherwise uncer-
tain." Van Doren Roofing & Cornice Co. v. Guard-
~an Cas. & Gu,aranty Co., 99 Wash 68, 168 P. 1124. 
It ·w:as the theme of Russell, in the trial court, not only to 
contradict the terms of Clause 8 of the lease by parol 
testimony, but also to show such language to be confus-
ing. The use of oral testimony in the case at bar serves 
as an ,acid test for the soundness of the parol evidence 
rule, for after its admission, the written instrument was 
still the best evidence of the lessor's intent in granting 
the ''right to renew". In Washington F?Jsh & Oyster Co. 
v. Halferty & Co., 269 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1954), after de-
termining that patrol testimony, received to clarify an 
ambiguity in a contract, was confusing and in conflict, 
the vV ashington Court stated: 
"* * * this case is an illustration of the sound-
ness of the rule (parol evidence rule) - that the 
writing still remains the best evidence of the 
understanding of the parties and of the terms by 
which they intended to hind themselves. The parol 
evidence of the parties admitted by the court was 
either conflicting or confusing as to the intent of 
the parties. ,. * *" 
11 
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It is submitted that it was erroneous to allow parol 
evidence to cause the ambiguity and predicated thereon, 
to deny Petitioner a "right'' which Clause 8 quite clearly 
.afforded him. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Court, based on the Petition and Brief of 
Grant L. Valentine, order a rehearing in the case at bar; 
that upon reeonsideration, the Court reverse the judg-
ment of the trial Court as to the issues raised by this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN & 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Petitioner 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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